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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Technical analysis as a forecasting tool for futures prices has been widely criticized 
and, in some cases, supported in the academic literature. It is in common use by the public, 
being frequently cited in the press and in market commentaries as having some short term 
impact o n future price movements. lt is often provided as a market analysis tool by market 
quotation services such as Data Transmission Network, Farm Broadcast Panners and other 
vendors. Publications like Technical Analysis of Stocks and Commodities and Futures offer 
regular articles on the u se of technical analysis in forecasting prices. Market advisory services 
frequent ly cite technjcal indicators when giving clients marketing advice. Many college 
courses in agricultural marketing at least provide an introduction to technical analysis. It is a 
large component of the market analysis done by many large commodity trading funds. 
Certainly it impacts both speculative and hedging decisions by many participants in the 
commodity futures markets. ff technical analysis has no value, many of the resources 
dedicated to market analysis are wasted. 
This research investigates the effectiveness of four technical indicators offutures price 
direction applied to the live hog futures market at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for the 
period 1987 to 1992. The types of indicators used are a Relative Strength lndex (RSI), a 
Directional Movement Index (DMT) and a Dual Moving Average (OMA). Detailed 
explanation of these technical analysis methods are provided in chapters 4-7. The DMl and 
DMA methods assume that prices are trending. Both attempt to identify the direction of a 
price trend and assume that the identified trend will continue. Jn contrast, the RSJ is often 
used as a predictor of market turning points. In this conventional role for RSJ , prices are 
assumed to oscillate between relatively high and relatively low values and the RSI indicates an 
"overbought" or "oversold" condition if its value is relatively high or low respectively. Used in 
this way, a change of price in the opposi te direction is assumed if the RSI is at extreme values . 
(e.g ., rapidly rising prices will generate a hjgh RSI that wou ld be interpreted as portending a 
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correction towards lower prices in the future) . But, RSI could also be a trend indicator since it 
reflects recent directional price movement. The two different uses of RSI will be distinguished 
by calling the conventional RSI , operating under the standard assumption of oscillating price, 
ORSI. The less standard use of RSI as a trend indicator will be referred to a TRSl. In both 
ORSI and TRSI, higher trending prices generate higher RSI values and lower trending prices 
produce lower RSI values, but the basic underlying assumption about future price direction 
differs. With TRSl, it is assumed price trends continue, while ORSI assumes price trends 
reverse in the future. 
Of these four methods of technical analysis investigated here, only ORSI operates 
under the assumption that prices osci llate, whil e the other three, (TRSI, DMI and DMA), 
assume that prices trend . Efficient market theory suggests that none of them will be effective 
if the market is weak form efficient, reflecting past publicly available price information, on 
which all of them depend. ff the market is efficient with respect to past prices, there is no 
reason to expect the market to go either up or down in the future, based on the information 
contained in those prices. While some technical analysis methods may use other market 
informat ion like volume and open interest figures, the four methods investigated here (ORSI, 
TRSI, DMJ and DMA) depend on ly on past price information that is readily avai lable from the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, brokers, newspapers, radio, television and electronic data 
information vendors. 
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) as fonnalized by Fama (1970) and explained 
by Marshall (1989) refers to a market's efficiency defined basically in terms of the speed and 
accuracy with which new information is processed into price changes. The current price 
should accurately reflect current informatjon, and subsequent price changes should be random, 
since all current information is "used up", including its ability to predict future new 
information shocks. According to trus hypothesis, the market is considered efficient with 
respect to a particular class of information. In the weak form, the market is efficient with 
respect to all past price history including volume and open interest information. With the semi-
strong form, the market is efficient with respect to all public infonnation. Public information 
.... 
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would include past market price information but also other types of information that might be 
regarded as available to all market participants. With respect to the hog futures market, 
U.S.D .A. quarterly hog and pig reports, estimated slaughter rates, cold storage reports, 
reports of wholesale pork movement as welJ as other supply and demand information, 
including information on pork substitutes like beef and chicken, would all be considered public 
information. In the strong form, the market is efficient with respect to even proprietary 
information. An example of proprietary information in live hog fu tures would be the private 
knowledge of an impending export deal of pork to Russia . This private info rmatio n regarding 
demand for pork and subsequently live hogs and live hog futures might be expected to affect 
expectations of market participants regarding future price levels and thus price itself, were the 
information public. If the possessors of this type of private information could not use it to 
profit in the market, then the market would be considered strong form efficient. 
ff subsequent price changes are random with respect to a particular current class of 
information, it will be impossible to predict price with that class of information in order to 
make a profit in the market. Jensen (1978) modified the concept of effi ciency, proposing that 
a market should be considered effici.ent if information could not be used to forecast price to 
the extent that profits exceeded transaction costs. 
The implications of the EMH on this study and price forecasting in general are clear. If 
the live hog futures market is weak form efficient, then TRSI, ORSI, DMI and OMA 
forecasting methods should be unable to produce profits w hen trading the futures market . The 
resources currently being spent on generating the technical analysis results are wasted, and 
market decisions based o n the methods will not lead to improved profits. If any of these four 
trading systems, or any other system based on past price can generate profits, the futures 
market is not weak form efficient. If that market is weak form inefficient, then it is also semi-
strong and strong form inefficient, since the weak form is a subset of the other two. With 
respect to futures market efficiency in general, Marshall (1989, p. 265) states. "Despite the 
theoretical appeal of the efficient markets hypothesis, it seems clear that the empirical 
evidence does not uniformly support it. On the other hand, those departures from efficiency 
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that have been detected are either not great, or have been identified by means that are 
themselves suspect." 
The existence of trends or oscillations in futures price series do not prove or disprove 
the efficiency of the market. Finding a technical system that would generate a profit in a 
historical price series is not sufficient. The key criteria is whether those patterns can be 
exploited to produce future profits. 
The null hypothesis for thi study is that the live hog futures market at the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange i weak form efficient, in the sense that profits exceeding transaction 
costs may not be extracted utilizing past price information Data for this study consists of 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange live hog futures prices for the June and December contracts 
from 1987 to 1992. The price data is broken down into three two year periods of '87-'88, '89-
'90, and '91 -'92 TR I, OR r, DMI and OMA trading methods are tested utilizing nine 
different combinations of fixed stop loss, trailing stop loss and no stop loss strategies. Each of 
the e combinations is tested over a wide range of values for the technical indicator buy and 
sell levels. Each general method /stop loss strategy (GTM) is historically optimized in the 
1987-1988 time period with regard to buy and sell level. Their out of sample performance is 
then analyzed for two subsequent two year periods. Two separate historical optimization 
criteria were utilized, total profit and an index based on the sum of profitable trades for the 
period and the um of the lo ing trades for the period. Profit , maximum draw down, total 
trades and percent profitable trades are reported for '89-'90 and '9 I -'92 for the 72 optimized 
trading rules a well as '87-'92 summary profit results for the 36 GTMs. The correlation of 
profits for each buy and sell level acres time periods is calculated for each of the 36 GTM's 
as a measure of the feasib ility of parameter optimization, a use of historically optimized 
trading strategies assumes that correlation of profits across time periods is positive. In 
addition, the sample mean profit and sample standard deviation of profit for each GTM is 
calculated for the entire 1987 to 1992 period, as well as a z score to test whether the mean 
profit is statistically greater than zero . 
Possible ources of inefficiency in the market that might support the feasibility of 
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technical anaJysi used in this study will be discussed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 will discuss 
general research procedures and methods used in this study Individual chapter discussing 
each of the four technical analysis methods follow, where the calculation of the indicator and 
individual test results are presented. Finally, the overall findings of this study and its 
implications are considered. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
If the effi cient markets hypothesis is correct, there should be no exploitable trends in a 
market price series. Delong et al. ( 1990) proposed that a positive feedback model might 
explain price behavior (and allow fo r the presence of a trend in price) . In this model, rational 
speculators buy ahead of noise demand knowing that there are "noise traders" who will buy on 
market strength and sell on market weakness, irrespective of market fundamental supply and 
demand information. This noise demand could be caused by traders using technical trend 
fo llowing systems, execution of stop loss or market orders around round numbers or 
technically obvious prices such as old highs and lows or the liquidation of positions due to 
margin calls on large price movements. A "follow the herd" mentality and the lack of 
immediate arbitrage by rational investors on the basis of fundamental information might be 
explained by risk aversion for the short term. When the stock market crashed in 1987, there 
was no obvious change in market information that might have caused a drop in stock prices of 
20% in o ne day . That would appear to be an example of positive feedback behavior in prices. 
The rational use of information external to the market might have implied buying any smal l dip 
immediately, yet information from the market itself may have prevented this immediate 
arbitrage. A fear that the market knew something that the individual trader did not, and 
outright fear and panic might have changed an individual's perception of the distribution of 
price given the information available. This type of behavior makes more plausible the 
existence of a trend exploi table by technical analysis, or the existence of an "overbought" or 
"oversold" condition exp lo itable by an RSI used as an oscillator- depending on the length of 
time that the positive feedback behavior influences pri.ces. The concept of being "overbought" 
or "oversold" implies a reversal in trend to an equilibrium price in the future . Predicting a 
continuation of trend implies that price has not reached an equilibrium based on the 
information that is known today. Neither idea fits with the immediate arbitrage assumed with 
an informationally efficient market. 
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Romer ( 1993) suggested that individual investors may have uncertainty about the 
quality of information possessed by others. They may look to the actions of other investors to 
adjust their own perception of value. Also, because of a great dispersion of information 
among investors, the individual incentive to trade on that information ma be small due to 
transaction costs. In either case, the ind ividual chooses not to trade immediately. Romer's 
theory allows fo r the rational use of information, but the full extent of the information is 
revealed by the market's action rather than being immediately reflected in price. Under this 
scenario, if a market fai led to respond to negative fundamental news, an individual trader 
might conclude that other traders had better quality information of a positive nature and thus 
adjust his valuation according to the trading behavior of the market. ln this case the positive 
news would be reflected over time in price rather than immediately and could account for 
some trend in price in the absence of new news. Either the positive feedback/noise model or 
Romer's model could account for the presence of an exploitable trend in an otherwise efficient 
market and thus allow for the potential success of price trend forecasting models based on 
past prices that do not immediately reflect all infom1ation 
Ma, Rao and Sears ( 1989) conducted a study on the effect of price limits on futures 
prices. The study indicated decreased volatility of futures prices in the presence of limits, 
which is consi tent with futures prices overreacting to information at times, in the absence of 
limits. If prices do overreact, it could result in the overbought and oversold conditions 
assumed by ORSI. Extended over a long enough time frame, overreaction could also be 
expected to generate trend patterns. Their study supported the hypothesis that prices may 
overshoot fundamental value at times. 
Futures contract price series are relatively short in length and suffer from liquidity 
problems in the months distant from contract expiration. The liquidity problems in the 
beginning of a contract's exi tence generates concern regarding the assumption of 
homogeneity within the entire series. Most research using actual price histories limits the use 
of a contract's life to those months nearer to expiration of the contract Some previous studies 
have created a synthetic price series by assuming a distri butional fom1 for the actual price 
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series and estimating the required parameters for that distribution from the contract price 
history. A synthetic price history is then constructed as long in length as desired, utilizing a 
Monte Carlo simulation technique and the estimated parameters. Brock, Lakonishok and 
Lebaron (1 992) studied technical analysis trading rules used on the hi storical Dow Jones 
Stock Index. They utilized various Monte Carlo simulations of price hi stories and compared 
them to results using the actual price series. Taylor ( 1994) explored the profitability of a 
technical analysis channel rul e using currency futures. H e rejected a null hypothesis o f zero 
excess returns at the I percent significance level and used a Monte Carlo simulation study to 
explore why the channel rule might generate positive returns. The simulatio n approach 
benefits from an increase in the number of observations, but accepts the risk of specification 
error regarding the process generating the price series. 
Another approach has been to use only nearby futures contracts. T hi s avoids liquidity 
concerns in the distant months of a given contract and the resulting concern regarding 
ho mogeneity wi thin an individual contract's lifetime. It limjts the degrees of freedom, 
however, as the contract is only analyzed when it is the contract closest to expiration 
("nearby"). To get additio nal degrees of freedom, the contract is then "roll ed over" when it 
expires, to the next contract month, with the assumption that the two contracts are 
homogeneous. This creates an artificial contract that is essentially continuous. The contract 
can also be rolled over prio r to expiration to avoid the possibility that the contract may have 
different distributional characteristics during its delivery period. Combining contiguous 
contracts creates more observations of price and increases degrees of freedom. Extrapolating 
re ul ts from the "continuous" price series to performance in actual futures markets involves 
accepting the ho mogeneity of contiguous contracts and accou nti ng somehow fo r the 
additional transactions costs of commissio ns and slippage that would be required to roll over 
positio ns when the nearby fu tures contract expired in the actual market. Baur ( 1990) 
approached the problem of sample period dependency in his study of fu tures market efficiency 
by forming such a "continuous" price series. He created an extremely long price series of 53 
futures prices and some 13 spread combinati ons over a period from January 1964 to April 
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t 992. He used this data to investigate whether past extreme returns had the power to predict 
future returns, and whether a risk premium exists in futures markets. He found evidence of 
some persistence in returns as well as evidence of a risk premium. 
Repeatable profits refute the efficient markets hypothesis by definition. At issue in the 
profit method of analysis is whether those profits are repeatable. Tomek ( 1984, p.22) warned 
of the possible presence of systematic components within a randomly generated price series 
due to chance. "The speculator clearly should be skeptical of claims that technical analysis of 
past prices can successfully forecast forthcoming prices." Profitable patterns can be found 
within historical futures price series. Some futures industry publications carry advertisements 
for trading systems claiming up to 90% profitable trades in a particular price history. Of 
course the implication that this performance will carry over into the future is doubtful to say 
the least. The prices of such systems seem well under the discounted present value of all of the 
future profits of a 90% successful system. It seems more plausible that the possessor of such a 
successful system would use it privately, rather than publicizing it and risking the inevitable 
arbitrage that a relatively efficient (if not totally efficient) market would bring. The key 
question is how any system will perform in forecasting future prices, not explaining past 
prices. It has been noted by Granger (1979) and others that publications about trading rules 
may be biased towards negative conclusions. "If such a (foolproof) strategy were found , it 
would hardly be made public, even by an academic." 
Schwager ( 1989, 1992) wrote two books entitled The Market Wizards and The New 
Market Wizards. The futures traders interviewed in these two books claim profits far 
exceeding in magnitude and consistency what would be expected in an efficient futures 
market, and Schwager mentions still other traders with remarkable profit records that are not 
included in these books. The specific trading rules of these traders are not revealed for 
obvious reasons, but both historical price information and public information are apparently 
used by most. 
Providing anecdotal evidence of market inefficiency, Murphy ( 1986) conducted a 
study where he used the performance of large commodity funds as a measure of the 
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effectivene of technical analysis in the futu res markets. While it may be true that the e large 
funds often use technical analysis in taking market po itions, they avail themselves of other 
types of information as well. The exact method of forecasting price naturally remain hidden 
for these funds, so the assumption that their market performance serves as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of technical analysis seems to be a rather strong one. Their performance has the 
advantage of being on public record and on the whole is rather poor so that may be 
con idered a weak vote for market efficiency al ome level. 
ome studies have shown that smaller traders perform rather poorly. They might be 
more likely to u e past price information because of its low cost and relative ease of u e. 
Large traders and commercial hedgers should have greater resources at their dispo al to 
conduct more costly and complicated forms of analysis such as fundamental supply and 
demand studies. That some groups of traders fail to consistently generate profits hardly 
disproves that it is possible to profitably predict prices. Indeed, Schwager's trader case studies 
provide anecdotal evidence that futures markets are informationally inefficient. 
Applying trading rules to actual price histories is not unique to this study, but neither is 
it a universally used procedure. Another approach used in other research has been to look for 
statistical patterns in the price series, which then are assumed to be proxies for trading profits 
if they are sufficiently predictable. tatistical searches for a profitable pattern of non 
randomness in a price series have utilized tests for serial correlation, runs analysis, fil ter rules 
and pectral analysis. Marshal l (I 989, p 264 ) states that the dependencies detected by the 
serial correlation and runs analysis methods may have a tenuous relationship with profitable 
mechanical trading rules. He describes filter rules as providing "a check for nonlinear financial 
type dependencies", and spectral methods as provid ing "a test in the frequency domain." 
Sweeney ( 1986) did a study of filter rules in the foreign exchange market and concluded that, 
during the period of time studied, there either appeared to be significant speculative profits 
possible or the presence of a significant time varying risk premium. Decoster, Labys and 
Mitchel ( 1992) studied commodity futures price and found evidence of a chaos ystem They 
found an apparent nonlinear structure to futures prices that was not inconsistent with the 
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deterministic component found in chaos. The conclusion was drawn that there was something 
beyond heteroscedasticity present in the price structure. They felt that chaos accompanied by 
noise is probably representative of commodity futures p1ices. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the presence of a pattern is only a necessary condition fo r the presence of a 
profitable trading rule. A relatively high degree of predictability of the pattern is the sufficient 
condition. This requires both pattern recognition and trading rule systems to be tested ex post 
to determine forecast accuracy. 
A chief cri ticism against checking market efficiency by measuring profits using a 
mechanical system is that results could be due to chance order within an otherwise random set 
of price changes, and thus not repeatable in future tests. This is a hard claim to refute 
empirically. 19 out of 20 flips of a supposedly balanced coin coming up heads would not 
prove conclusively that it was unbalanced , nor would 90% profitable trades over the course of 
thi s study conclusively prove that the profits were due to anything other than random chance. 
A long string of observations would be desired to test the balance of the coin as would a long 
string of actual trades to t est profitabi lity. Additionally, markets may change so that different 
patterns exist at different times and are exploitable by different trading rules or different 
parameters for those rules at different times. If the pattern required to be profitable is 
discernable to a trader and he does change trading rules, as some of the traders interviewed by 
Schwager seemed to indicate that they had done, the presence of consistent profits would 
provide evidence of an inefficient market. This study does not attempt to switch technical 
trading ru les based on a discernable pattern. Jt does seem reasonable to expect the ORSI 
method to do well when the TRST, DMI and DMA methods do poorly, and vice versa, 
because the general data structure required to generate a buy for the ORSI would generate a 
sell for the other three, irrespective of any predictive power. 
There have been a number of academic articles published regarding the profitability of 
trading systems based on past price information. Pruit, Tse and White ( 1988, 1989, 1992 pp. 
55-56) did a study of a composite technical analysis based trading system they called 
CRlSMA lt utilized a Relative Strength, Moving Average and a cumulative volume 
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component and generated a risk adjusted return of 6. 13% to 35.65% for stocks and 12.05% 
to 28. 72% return per round turn for stock options in the January 1976 to December 1985 
period. A subsequent tudy of the January 1986 through December 1990 period howed a risk 
adjusted return of 22.28% to 26.45%, before transaction costs. They stated : "We believe a 
finding of continued success fo r the CRlSMA system would provide important and convincing 
new evidence concerning the (in)efficiency of the securities markets and the ability of 
investors to "beat the market" by employing complex technicaJ trading strategies." Two of the 
technical analysis component used in their study on stocks and options are evaJuated in this 
live hog futures study- a relative strength and moving average indicator. 
lr..vin and Uhrig (J 984) did a study where they evaluated 4 technical trading systems 
over 8 different commodities with all of the systems showing substantial profits for the 1961 
to 198 1 period. Live hog futures were among one of the futures markets anaJyzed util izing a 
channel system, moving average, dual moving average and a directional indicator sy tern. 
Taylor ( 1985) did a study of futures prices where he studied the autocorrelation in prices and 
found evidence to reject the random walk hypothesis at the 5% significance level He stated 
that "Market efficiency might perhaps be refuted by finding the profit potential of a trading 
rule based on past prices." He later did a study published in 1992 where filter, channel and 
moving average technicaJ trading rules were compared to an ARIMA time series forecast for 
currency futures during the December 198 1 to November 1987 time period. AJI of the trading 
rules were profitable and the conclusion was drawn that the profits were too large to be 
explained by a ti me-varying premium, thus implying inefficient pricing. Nefci and Policano 
(1984, p. 465) did a study on a moving average and slope method of forecasting futures 
prices, finding that the moving average had some predictive power in the RMSE en e but 
that the slope method gave mixed results. They mention "If futures markets are efficient, then 
the exi tence of traders who use technical analysis is certainly an anomaly." 
Lukac, Brorsen and Irwin (1988) tested 12 different technical trading systems with 12 
different commodities from 1978 to 1984 Live hog futures were not con idered. even of the 
systems generated significant gross returns while 4 of the systems generated significant net 
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and risk adjusted returns. The authors felt that a disequilibrium model provided a better 
description of short run futures price movements than did a random walk model. The 
disequilibrium model allows a slower than instantaneous adjustment to new information 
shocks due possibly to information costs, transaction costs or risk aversion. Channel systems, 
momentum oscillators, moving averages and systems with trailing stops were all used in their 
study. 
Lukac and Brorsen (1989, pp. 55-65) did a study on the usefulness of historical 
optimization of parameters for technical trading systems. This is what the current research 
attempts to do in the 1987-1988 period for hog futures prices. Lukac and Brorsen looked at 
optimizing the parameters for a DMl and channel system in 15 markets. A survey in 1987 
showed that 15 out of 19 futures fund advisory g roups did optimize their technical trading 
systems based o n past prices. Lukac and Brorsen concluded that historical optimization was of 
limited use with the random selection of parameters performing as well. The current research 
addresses the optimization problem by tracking out of sample performance of historically 
selected trading rules, but also by investigating the performance of every parameter set over 
the whole 6 year period for each technical forecasting method. Lukac and Brorsen do state in 
their study that "These results reject the random walk for commodity prices." Their two 
technical systems were significantly profitable over their diversified 15 market portfolio . 
Whether the actual forecast methods looked at in this current study are useful is 
heavily dependent on the efficiency of the market, either in a temporal sense or with respect to 
the actual market incorporation of information. Somehow, to be useful , the forecasting 
methods must indicate where the market is going before it gets there. This would imply that 
the market did not process the forecasting information faster and more correctly than the 
forecast method, and thus was inefficient. There have been a number of academic studies that 
challenge the efficient markets hypothesis as the best model available to explain financial 
market behavior. Many of the alternative models present some theoretical basis for expecting 
some nonrandomness in future price direction. If using forecasts found optimum in the '87-'88 
period out of sample over 4 years shows a substantial profit, it will indicate some degree of 
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market inefficiency as well as provide evidence of the usefulness of the forecast method in 
making marketing decisions. 
This study was directed towards three general objectives: 
I . Test whether out of sample profitable trading rules for ORSI, TRSI, OMA, and DMI using 
nine different stop strategies (36 different GTMs) could be identified using '87-'88 
optimization results. 
2. Investigate the stability of performance of buy and sell level parameters generally for the 36 
GTMs between the three periods of the price data .. 
3. Determine how well each of the GTMs performed over the entire 1987 to 1992 period. 
The first objective is important because the critical concern in choosing a trading 
technique is choosing one that will work well out of sample. Historical profits or "fit" to the 
data does not in itself imply any forecasting ability. Traders do not trade GTMs. They trade 
specific individual t rading rules consisting of a rule for when to buy and a rule for when to 
sell. The first objective was tested in this study by rating all of the '87-'88 period performances 
for each trading rule within each GTM, choosing the best individual rule for that period, and 
tracking its performance in 2 subsequent periods, '89-'90 and '9 J-'92 . 
The second objective is important because of the limited number of observations 
obtained ffom tracking individual trading rule ex post performance while investigating 
objective one. Tracking the correlation of profits between the three periods '87-'88, '89-'90 
and '9 l -'92 fo r every individual trading rule within a GTM and averaging those correlations 
gives a statistic suggesting the amount of period to period stability of performance that might 
be expected of any individual trading rule within the GTM. 
The third objective obtains a broad measure of how well the GTMs fit the entire 1987 
to 1992 time period on average. Mean profit and standard deviation of profit provide a means 
of comparing GTM performance in the historical period. 
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CHAPTER3 
RE EARCH PROCEDURES 
Data 
Technical analysis trading rules are applied to actual price histories in the live hog 
futures market obtained rrom the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Individual Turbo Pascal 
programs test the technical analysis trading methods on the hi storical data, utilizing an I.B.M. 
compatible personal computer. Summary output, daily trade records and dai ly parameter 
calculations are employed to verify the accuracy of the computer algorithms. 
Thi study uti lizes the daily open, high, low and closing prices for the live hog futures 
contracts at the Chicago Mercantil e Exchange expiring in December and June for the period 
of 1987 to 1992. (DMJ uses all 4 daily prices while the other three trading methods use only 
daily closing and opening prices.) Each contract's price series is truncated to approximately 
the nine months prior to expiration in deference to concerns over liquidity, and is only traded 
for approximately 6 month prior to expiration. This resu lts in a series of prices where a 
contract is available to trade each day the market is open, with the actual contract traded 
being June for approximately six months, followed by December for six months and 
alternating thereafter The technica l indicators are calculated tarting nine month prior to 
expiration on each individual contract to allow the longer length parameters time to generate a 
trading signal by the first day of trading for the contract. Trading using the June contract 
begins the day fo llowing the expiration of the previous December contract, and December i 
used starting on the day following the expiration of the previous June contract Homogenei ty 
is assumed within each individual contract, from nine months prior to expiration to the close 
of the last trading day, and between the June and December contracts. The same trading rules 
are used on both the June and the December contracts. It is not a continuous price series, as 
all open trade are closed out at a contract's expiration. If a position is taken the following 
trading day, it is in the next contract using the technical indicator calculated ba ed on that 
contract's price series 
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This research divides the six years of historical prices into three periods of two years 
each, '87-'88, '89-'90, and '9 1-'92. Results are reported by period. It would be desirable to 
have more years and additional periods, but even this amount of price data generates huge 
volumes of o utput. This is primarily due to the fact that each technicaJ analysis method is 
looked at under nine different stop loss strategies and across a wide range of parameter 
values. 
Procedures and Calcul ations 
AH positions are taken o r closed out at the opening price of the day following a trading 
signal, w ith the exception of an o pen position on the day of a contract's expi ratio n. Trading 
signals are always evaluated after the market closes. If a signal indicates a trade, it is always 
made at the fol lowing day's opening price. 
A trading buy or sell signal can come from two sources- the technical indicator or a 
stop loss rule. Once a position is establi shed based on the technica l indicator, it wi ll be held 
until the technical indicator gives a signal to reverse the position, a stop loss ru le is triggered 
to close the position, or the contract expires. If the technical indicator gives a signal in the 
opposite direction of the current open position, two contracts are traded at the fo llowing day's 
opening price. One contract closes out the current position, and the second contract 
establ ishes a new open position in the opposite direction. In the case of a stop loss rule being 
activated , o nly one contract is traded at the next day's opening price to close out the existing 
position. After being stopped out in this fas hion or being closed out due to contract 
expiration, a new technical indicator signal is required to establish a new position. It is 
possible with an open position that both a stop loss signal and a technical indicator signal are 
generated simultaneously after the close of the market. In thi s case, two contracts are traded 
on the following market's open in the opposite direction from the current position. Jn effect, 
the stop loss is executed and a new position is taken simultaneously based on the technical 
indicator. 
Stop losses are calculated for open positions using the closing price of the day and 
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when executed, are done so at the opening price of the following day. Stop loss rules are 
evaluated fo r the TRST, DMT, DMA and ORSI, to more closely replicate real world trading 
practices. A stop loss rule acknowledges loss aversion on the part of market participants. This 
study attempts to fit different degrees of loss aversion by the range of the stop loss rules 
evaluated. At one end of the spectrum is a risk loving market participant who uses no stop 
loss rule at all. At the other extreme would be someone who did not participate in the futures 
markets becau e of the risk involved. Of those individuals inclined to participate, but with 
some degree of loss aversion, four arbitrary nominal levels of risk are selected with two 
different methods of calculating the risk. The methods involve a fixed stop and a traiLing stop 
level, each calculated on nominal values of $250, $500, $750 and $1000 per trade. A fixed 
stop level is calculated by detem1ining the price level for the contract at which an open 
position, closed out at that price, would sustain the nominal level of loss. Thi nominal level of 
loss includes a $90 transaction cost. If the loss ca lculated at the day's closing price is equal to 
or exceeds this nominal level , the open position is closed out at the foll owing day's opening 
price. A fixed stop loss level is "fixed" in the sense that it depends on static values: the initial 
contract price of the position, the nominal loss level and a transactio n cost. Once a position is 
taken, the price level required to generate a fixed stop loss signal never changes for that 
position. 
A trailing stop loss signal is also executed at the following day's opening price, but the 
calculation of the price level required to generate the trailing stop loss signal is different. A 
trailing stop loss models the behavior of a market participant who is more risk averse than the 
user of the fixed stop. The user of a trailing stop, in effect, marks his position to the market 
every day with respect to his stop level. Like the fixed stop user, the trader is unwilling to lose 
more than the nominal value of the trailing stop, ($250, $500, $750 or $1000), but calculates 
the loss based on lost profits, as well as initial margin. lf the market moves in a favorable 
direction after initiating the trade, the trail ing stop price level follows the market in that 
direction. The price level required to generate a stop loss signal is calculated from either the 
initial position price, or the most profitable subsequent closing price with respect to the open 
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position. Tn long positions, the highest closing price after the initial buy price or the initial buy 
price is used in the calculation of the stop price signal. In short positions, the lowest closing 
price after the initiaJ selling price or the initial selling price is utilized. ln the case of an open 
long position, a trailing stop of $250 is calculated by the fo llowing formula : max (initial price, 
subsequent closing prices) - (5250 - S90 transaction cost.\) maximum closing price 
required lo generate an at the market sell order on the following open. A fixed $250 stop fo r 
an open short po ition is calculated by: initial sell price 1 (S250 - S90) minimum c/o. i11g 
price required lo generate an at the market buy order on the following open. 
The nine variations of stop loss rules allows the four different technical strategies to 
be tested in a way that mimics how different traders with varying levels of risk aversion might 
actually use the methods. 
The stop loss strategy used in this study evaluates the current day' clo ing price to 
generate a signal which is then executed on the following day's open. Jt was not possible to 
use intraday prices to calculate the closing price level required to generate a stop loss signal, 
due to the limitation of the data (open, high, low and close). A fixed stop price could have 
been caJculated but not a trailing stop. The fixed stop requires only the initial trade price and 
stop loss level to calculate a stop loss price that could be entered as an open stop loss order 
held over from day to day. The tra iling stop loss strategy is more complicated. For the t railing 
stop loss, the price level required fo r a signal could potentially change throughout the day if 
calculated on intraday prices, because of the way the trailing top follows favorable price 
movement. The day's possible price range of $ 1200 ($1.50 cwt. limit x 2) exceeds all of the 
tra iling stop levels Specili.c stop price levels could change during the day for all of them if 
they were calculated on the intraday high or low price. To know whether a trai ling stop based 
on intraday price has been triggered requires knowing whether a stop level price occurred 
after the intraday high or low was achieved (if that high or low generates a new stop trigger 
price). This was not possible with the data used in this study. If trade by trade price 
information were avail able, intraday trailing stops could be calculated, bu t the implementation 
of that strategy would require the market participant or his broker to closely monitor the 
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market for new stop loss levels throughout the day. 
The previous day's high or low could be used in place of its closing price in calculating 
new trailing stop levels. This would not be unreasonable, but the close was selected because it 
is often the more recent price level and might better reflect the market equilibrium price. 
Market efficiency argues for the more recent price. An assumption of market inefficiency may 
argue for choosing the closing price over the extremes of the day as well. It makes sense to 
think of fundamental supply and demand traders as longer term in focus and noise traders, if 
they exist, as short term traders. If noise traders do drive price temporarily away from 
fundamental value on an intraday basis but tend to cover their positions at the end of the day, 
the closing price should more closely reflect fundamental value, and be a more reliable choice 
for calculating market signals. Some market advisory services utilize market close only orders, 
implying a stronger confidence in the closing price. Following this rationale, previous closing 
prices are used in this study to calculate trailing stop price levels and current closing prices are 
used to determine if the stop price has been exceeded. 
The decision to close out a trade on the fo llowing open was not necessary for the live 
hog futures market, even assuming that closing price was evaluated for the generation of the 
stop loss signal. It would have been possible to assume that stop loss orders were executed at 
the closing price of the day. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange allows a stop, close only order 
that could have been used for the execution of the stop loss. The stop price level required to 
be exceeded for the day is always known from the previous day's closing price, so it would be 
possible to enter a stop, close only order at that specific price. Other exchanges do not allow 
the placement of this type of order (e.g., the Chicago Board of Trade) and it would be 
necessary for the market participant or his broker to monitor closing price and place a market 
order at the close to execute this type of stop strategy in those markets. By adopting the 
convention of executing stop loss signals on the following open, the stop loss strategy in this 
study is readily transferable to other contracts at other exchanges, without requiring constant 
monitoring of the closing prices. 
Executing stop loss orders on the following open does allow for considerable slippage 
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(or gain) on big move days, depending on the direction of the move from the previou day's 
price and the open position. The average difference in price between the previous day's close 
and the fo llowing open, calculated for all days eligible to be traded for this study is very small , 
o nly $0.001326 per cwt. or 53 cents in profi t or loss. Though small in average effect, the 
slippage could significantly alter results of small samples . 
There are 5 trading days in this study that the opening price is at limit bid or asked 
from the previous close. On 2 of the 5 days, prices traded 40 cents per cwt. off the limit price 
during the day o that an assumption that an order is fi !Jed at the opening price would seem 
reasonable. It may be unreasonable to assume slippage of$. 025 per cwt. on a trade if the 
direction of the trade requires the slippage to be applied beyond the daily price limit, but that 
is not accounted for in the program used to run the trading simulations. A more serious 
departure of simulated results from those that would have tran pired in the real world is 
possible on the 3 days where prices opened limit bid or asked and did not move that day. The 
trading simulatio n programs assume trade signal execution at t he opening price, and since 
volume of trading is not used in this study, it is unknown whether the assumed trade actually 
occurred If it did not, those three days all could have been traded at the fo llowing open price, 
but those prices were $1.27, $1.50 and $1.30 beyond the previous day's locked prices in the 
direction of the previous day's limit move. The imulation programs do not record if trade 
signals occured on these three days 
As mentioned previously, Lukac and Bror en ( 1989) concluded that hi torical 
optimization of technical trading methods was of limited use, with random selection of key 
parameter values found to be as effective. The trength of any conclusions in the current study 
regarding an optimum parameter level selected in the '87-'88 period and tested ex post in the 
periods of'89-'90 and '91-'92 is limited by having only 2 out of sample test periods. Looking 
at all 72 optimized GTM's provides a number of observations on those 2 out of sample 
periods, but all of the observations are based on the same underlying price structure. (36 
GTM' hi torically optimized on two eparate criteria yields 72 individual trading rule with 2 
out of sample periods each). 
21 
Two criteria were selected to choose the optimum perfonning '87-'88 trading rule for 
a GTM which is then tested out of sample in the '89-90 and '91-'92 periods. One optimization 
criteria is total profit per time period. The other is an index based on period profit and period 
loss. election is made for the highest profit within the GTM in the first case, and the highest 
index in the econd. The index is computed as follows· (period'. profitable trade sum 
greatest period profitable trade sum for ClM) - ( perwd's losmg trade sum most negative 
period lo ing trade sum for G TM). The highest possible index score is I, attained when the 
period profit sum for the trading rule equals the maximum for the GTM and the loss sum is 
zero. The lowest po ible index score is -1 , when the period profit sum i 0 and the period loss 
sum equals the most negative period loss sum for the GTM The index incorporates period 
losses into a weighting scheme where relative performance with regard to both profit and loss 
are considered in picking an optimum trading rule. 
Maximum drawdown is a measure of risk and capital requirements for a market 
participant and, as such, is an important result reported in this study. It can be thought of as a 
rough measure of the capital required (beyond initial margin for one contract) to trade a 
particular system over the two year period. Using maximum drawdown instead of period 
cumulative loss as part of the historical index used for optimization was initially considered. It 
was not included, because like period profit and loss, its inclusion in an index to predict future 
performance implicitly assumes that past performance will to some degree repeat itself in the 
future. That assumption may be on omewhat shakier ground with regard to maximum 
drawdown than it is with period profit and loss. This is because period profit or period loss i 
not order dependent while maximum drawdown is. A series of profits and los e in any order 
result in the same sum of profits and same sum of losses for the eries. A change in the order 
dramatically changes the maximum drawdown calculation for the same series. There eems to 
be no reason to assume that profits and losses should repeat themselves in any type of order in 
future period , even if the trading method captures some type of market inefficiency. For thi 
reason, the sum of period losses was chosen as a measure of market risk for the optimization 
index. 
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Maximum drawdown is defined as zero or the lowest negative account balance over a 
2 year period, whichever is Jess. The lowest account balance is calculated as if no money is 
deposited initially in the futures account at the start of the two year period. While initial 
margin is required to trade futures contracts, it can be met by T-bills and other interest bearing 
instruments and is not used in the calculation of drawdown here. All open positions are 
marked to market at the close of each day, with the transaction cost of $90.00 included in the 
calculation, even though the commission and exchange fees, as well as slippage on the exit of 
the trade, may not have occurred yet. Since the position is open, they will occur and are 
accounted for. This calculated value of any open position is added to the running total of 
profit for the two year period on all previously closed out positions. The maximum drawdown 
takes on the lowest value of these daily calculations, or zero whichever is less. Profit is 
calculated from only completed trades. 
In addition to using a direct approach of testing the effectiveness of historical 
optimization with actual optimized trading rules used out of sample, a simple correlation of 
profits across time periods is calculated for all individual buy and sell level combinations 
investigated. It provides an objective measure of how stable the performance of the parameter 
combinations are, taken as a whole, and provides an extension to Lukac and Brorsen's study. 
Individual period profit for each buy/sell level combination is taken to be an element in a 
vector of profits for a particular GTM for that period. The simple correlation of the elements 
of these vectors between periods yields a crude measure of the stabi lity of parameter 
performance. Correlation coefficients near 0 support Lukac and Brorsen's find ings that 
historical optimization of parameters is of questionable value. Since the historical 
optimizations used in this study select for high profits in the historical period, positive 
correlation coefficients greater than 0 tend to support historical optimization. A finding of a 
negative coefficient might suggest that choosing an opti mum parameter combination based on 
poor profit performance in the preceding historical period should be considered. 
Profits are calculated with an adjustment for transaction costs. Those costs are 
estimated to be constant at $90.00 per round turn, consisting of $70.00 in commission and 
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exchange fees, as well as slippage of $.025 per cwt. when entering the trade and $.025 per 
cwt. when exiting. ($ .025 per cwt. is the minimum price movement in live hog futures, 
equaling $I 0.00 on a 40,000 pound contract). 
1f market prices are determined by an efficient process, profits would not be expected 
to be consistent from one period to the next, as the future price direction would be the result 
of a random process. Given enough observations, the expected result would be a loss of the 
tran action costs in an efficient market. 
Summary Tables 
The following chapters are devoted individually to ORSI, TRS l, OMA and DMl. The 
same summary table format is used in each chapter. The out of sample summary table for 
trading rules selected on the ba is of historical profit, and the table for those rules selected on 
the basis of a calculated index represent the out of sample period results for an individual 
trading rule selected for each sto p loss strategy within the general technical analysis method. 
Both the period correlation table and the mean profit, standard deviation and z score table 
represent all of the individual trading rules within a given stop loss strategy I technical analysis 
method. Both of the latter tables are intended to give an overall picture of a particular method 
of technical analysi s complemented by a particular stop loss strategy, while the out of sample 
tables represent specific trading rules within the general methods and stop loss strategies. 
The z score presented in the last column of the last table in chapters 4-7 is calculated 
to test the null hypothesis that the 2 year population mean for a particular technical analysis 
method I stop loss strategy i equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis is that the true mean 
profit is greater than zero and the test is conducted at the 5% significance level. The z score is 
calculated as: (sample mean - 0) (.mmple standard deviation . ·quare root of# of observed 
G7M 2 year profit ). Since the number of observations of 2 year profits always great I 
exceeded 1,000 for each GTM, the sampling distribution of the mean is assumed to be 
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approximately normal and the critical value required to reject the null hypothesi was found 
to be 1.645 obtained from a standard normal table. Any time the z score exceeded 1.645 for a 
GTM, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level and the alternative hypothesi 
accepted that the true mean profit for the GTM is greater than zero . 
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CRAPTER4 
OSCILLATING RELATIVE STRENGTH INDEX 
Procedure 
The ORSI trading method, like all technical analysis trading methods, is based on past 
price information ORSI is what is commonly called the Relative Strength Index or RSI by 
users of technical analysis. It is referred to as ORSI in this tudy to remind the reader that it 
depends on the theory of osci ll ating prices and to distinguish it from TRS l, which is a less 
conventional method of using the same RSI statistic as an indicator of trending prices. In this 
tudy, daily closing prices were used to compute the RSI tatistic for both ORSI and TR I It 
was computed for 27 different day lengths, from 4 to 30, using the following method of 
computation. The difference between the current closing price and the previous day's clo e 
(Pricedift:) was calculated for each contract's 9 month price history prior to expiration. Then, 
using an N day length parameter, the positive Pricediff vari ables over the previous N days 
(including the current day) were summed in a PosSum variable for the current day. The same 
thing was done for the negative Pricedi ff variables which were summed in a egSum variable 
for the current day. The current day's RSI was then calculated by: / PosS11m (Pos um + 
ahs(NegSum)) / * JOO. RSl ranges in value from 0 to I 00 (0 when all of the N days price 
changes have been negative and I 00 when all of them have been positive). Because there were 
9 months of price data for each hog futures contract, there were an adequate number of 
observations to compute the longest RSI prior to the contract being considered eligible to 
trade, which began approximately 6 months prior to expiration. A day's R I i assumed to be 
calculated after the close of trading and includes the price difference between the close of the 
current day and the previous day. 
The proportion of dollar changes up in value to the total dollar changes both up and 
down, measured from close to close over the previous - I days plus the current day, i what 
determines the level of RSI. Strong up trending pri ces generate high RSI values, while strong 
down trending price generate low RSI values as demonstrated in Figure 4. 1. 
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Figure 4.1 9 day R l calculated for the June '87 live hog futures contract. 
Under an assumption of osci llating price, if price has headed predominantly in one 
direction in the past, it is assumed to head in the other direction in the future. Thus with 
ORSJ , high RSI values are sell signals and low R .I values are buy signals. When a day's RSI 
first reaches or goe above a elected critical sell level, a contract is sold on the following 
day's open. When the RSf fir t reaches or goes below a critical buy level, a contract is bought 
on the following open. 49 different combinations of buy and ell levels were tested across 27 
different day lengths for each of 9 ORSI GTMs in this study. The critical R I buy levels 
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ranged in value from 0 to 30 and the sell levels ranged from 70 to I 00, both in steps of 5. 
In all, 11 ,907 individual trading rules were tested for the general technical analysis 
trading strategy of ORSI ( 1,323 day length buy-sell combinations tested over 9 different stop 
Joss strategies) . Each of thee 11 ,907 individual rules was tested in each of the '87-'88, '89-'90 
and '9 1-'92 time periods. That many observations would be expected to show some profitable 
results on a given price history, even if that price series was randomJy generated. Thi study 
eeks to minimize the weight given individual trading rules that look profitable historically. 
Only the ex post performance of histo rically optimized trading rules should be considered 
relevant in evaluating profitability. 
Results 
Table 4 .1 represents the out of sample period results for the 9 individual OR I GTM 
trading rule selected on the basi of '87-'88 profi t while Table 4.2 represents the 9 methods 
elected o n the basis of '87-'88 index scores. Note that f stands for fixed and t stands for 
trailing under the sto p los rule column. (e g., f250 represents a fixed stop of $rO.OO) The 
most profitable out of sample trading ru le in table 4. I was a 9- 15-100 ru le using a fi xed stop 
of $750 00. The 9 represent the day length used to compute the R I, the 15 repre ents the 
RSI buy level and the 100 is the RSl sell level. This rule generated a $3920.00 profit and had 
a maximum drawdown of -$ 1 I 00 in '89-'90. In '9 l-'92 it had a $3970.00 profit with a 
maximum drawdown of -$ 1220. Jn '89-'90, 50% of the total trades were profi table. In '9 l-'92, 
67% of total trades were profitable . It generated 11 total trades for the 4 year out of sample 
period of 1989 to 1992. The least profitable out of sample performance in Table 4 . I was a 16 
day R 1 wit h a buy level of 30 and a sell level of 90 using a trailing $250 stop It lost a total of 
$3880 over the 4 year period. 
The most profitable out o f sample trading rule selected by the index core is found in 
Table 4.2 and was a 9-20- 100 rule using a fixed $750.00 stop. The wor t performing index 
selected rule was a 13 day R I using a 30 buy level, 95 sell level and a $250 trailing stop loss. 
The same day length buy-sell level appears as an optimized selection under more than one 
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stop loss strategy. Also, the same rule was selected by the profit and index criteria at times, 
resulting i_n a combined total of 13 different rules. While the stop level strategy did affect 
results, it appeared that the fit of an individual trading rule to the '87-'88 data was more 
dependent on the day length and buy and sell parameters than it was on the stop loss strategy. 
The day length parameter was tested from 4 to 30. The optimum day length selected on the 
basis of both profit and the i_ndex ranged in length from 8 to 16 days. Market commentators 
often use an RSI of 30 as the threshold level for an oversold condition and a 70 level for an 
overbought condition on a 9 or 14 day RSI. While the optimum buy level selected was 30 in 
12 out of 18 cases for both profit and index optimization, the sell level tended to be at the 
extreme high end, ranging from 90 to 100 in every case. The results suggest that perhaps an 
RSI buy level higher than 30 should have been tested in the study. Since the maximum 
possible level for an RSI is 100, the optimum selections suggest that the 70 to 100 range 
tested for sell levels was adequate. 
The out of sample profits seem rather high (recognizing that many of the methods 
selected were similar) . The total 4 year profit for aJI of the ORSI profit optimized trades was 
$24,480 generated from a total of 158 trades for an average profit of$ I 54.94 per trade. The 
total 4 year profit for the index selected group was $22, 720 earned on 226 total trades for an 
average profit of$100.53 . 
For the profit optimized group, the average 2 year total profit for the no stop loss rule 
was $1030 (only 2 period observations). For the fixed stop rules the average 2 year total 
profit was $2, 740 and for the trailing stop rules the average profit was $62.50. 
The correlations of profit between periods for each of the 9 ORSI GTMs are 
presented in Table 4.3. The correlation of profit between periods is calculated on aU 1323 
individual trading rule profit observations per period for each GTM listed in the table. They 
are uniformly positive and surprisingly high. A positive correlation merely suggests that when 
the earlier period observed profit for a specific buy-sell level is above its mean, the other 
periods' observation on the same buy-sell level tends to be above its mean also, and vice versa. 
It should be noted that the observations in the profit vectors used in calculating the correlation 
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statistic were not just the pro fit optimized results but all of t he profit results, and many were 
negative. Indeed, all of the GTMs in all of the periods had negative mean profits. The high 
positive correlation values tend to support the profitable performance of the individual trading 
methods selected in the '87-'88 period and tested out of sample. Had the worst profitable 
trading methods been selected in '87-'88, the positive correlation stati stics suggest that they 
probably would have performed poorly out of sample as well 
Table 4 . I Out of ample results of ORSI trading rules hi storically optimized on 
'87-'88 profit 
stop day I. 89-90 91 -92 89-90 91-92 89-90 9 1-91 
loss buy I. profit profit max. max ratio + ratio + 
rule sell I d.d. d.d trades trades 
none 10-30-95 -$20 $2080 - $620 -$ 1530 0.6 0.6 
f250 9- 15- 100 $900 $3930 -$ 1620 -$1260 0.18 0.4 
f300 8-10-10() $ 1610 $3910 -$ 170 -$ 1220 0.43 0.67 
f750 9- 15- 100 $3920 $3970 -$1100 -$ 1220 0.5 0.67 
fl OOO I 0-30-9- $2060 $ 1620 -$720 -$1 990 0 .5 0.43 
t250 16-30-90 -$3920 $40 -$4480 -$2050 0.22 0 5 
t500 8-1 0- 100 -$690 $2090 -$970 -$110 0.29 0.75 
t750 I0-30-95 $1590 -$ 1200 -$ 1440 -$3670 0.4 1 0.36 
t 1000 16-30-95 -$1060 $3650 -$2260 -$1420 0.38 0.57 
89-92 
total 
trades 
15 
16 
10 
11 
19 
30 
11 
31 
15 
30 
Table 4.2 Out of sample results of ORSI trading rules historically optimized on 
'87-'88 index values 
stop day I. 89-90 91-92 89-90 91-92 89-90 91-92 
loss buy I. profit profit max. max ratio + ratio + 
rule sell I. d.d. d.d. trades trades 
none 10-30-95 -$20 $2080 - $620 -$ 1530 0.6 0.6 
f.250 16-30-95 -$1480 $1 190 -$ 1980 -$3110 0.2 0.22 
f500 -10-100 $ 16 10 $39 10 -$170 -$1220 0.43 0.67 
f750 9-20- 100 $3080 $3330 -$1100 -$1860 0.43 0.5 
flOOO 10-30-95 $2060 $ 1620 -$720 -$1990 0.5 0.43 
t250 13-30-95 -$770 -$140 -$2 180 -$ 1500 0.24 0.4 1 
t500 I 0-30-95 $200 $2450 -$ 1440 -$ 1060 0.33 0.6 L 
t750 10-30-95 $1590 -$1200 -$1440 -$3670 0.41 0.36 
tlOOO 10-30-95 $1590 $1620 -$720 -$1860 0.47 0.45 
89-92 
total 
trades 
15 
19 
16 
11 
19 
53 
36 
31 
26 
The individual stop loss strategies listed in the first column of Table 4.3 represent the 9 
different ORST GTMs. Each of the next 3 columns represent the correlat ion statistic 
calculated between two periods and the last column represents the simple average correlation 
calculated from the 3 listed pairs of periods. The average of the values reported in column 5 of 
Table 4.3 is .6 1 and is reported for comparison purposes with the other 3 trading methods. 
For purposes of comparing period correlat ion of profit between general stop 
strategies, column 5 was averaged by stop strategy. It was found to be .62 for the 4 fixed stop 
levels and .62 for the trailing stop levels in the table. The no stop loss rule had an average 
correlation across the periods of .56. 
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Table 4 .3 ORSI period correlation statistics 
stop 87-88 87-88 89-90 average 
loss 89-90 91-92 9 1-92 
none 0 .63 0.64 0.42 0.56 
f250 0.74 0.73 0.55 0.68 
fSOO 0.7 1 0.66 0.5 1 0.62 
f750 0.69 0.64 0.52 0.6 1 
flOOO 0.62 0.63 0.45 0.57 
t250 0.80 0.79 0.64 0.74 
t500 0.83 0 .58 0.45 0.62 
t750 0.74 0.45 0.38 0 .52 
tlOOO 0.72 0 .62 0.42 0.59 
The mean profits and mean standard deviations of profit in Table 4.4 represent the 
mean 2 year profit and standard deviation of 2 year profit for all rules tested in the entire 1987 
to 1992 period for each ORSI stop loss strategy. They reflect how well a GTM fit the entire 
historical data series. The large standard deviations for all of the methods and negative mean 
profits mean that the ORSI GTM profits are not greater than zero at the 5% significance level. 
AJl of the z scores are strongly negative and less than the 1 .645 critical value so that the null 
hypothesis of zero profit is not rejected for any ORSI GTM. It would seem that in order to be 
profitable, it would be necessary to find an optimum parameter set for any of the ORSI GTMs 
or be lucky. The limited data set used does not totally rule out luck, but the appearance of the 
out of sample profits for ORSI do not argue in that direction. 
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Table 4.4 ORSl 1987- 1992 2 year mean profit, standard 
deviation of profit and z scores. 
stop loss mean profit std. dev. z scores 
none -$1, 746.68 $4, 109.27 -26.78 
£250 -$2,353 .95 $4,371.78 -33 .92 
500 -$ 1, 754.00 $4, 113 .15 -26.87 
f750 -$1,705 .82 $4,047. 10 -26.55 
f!OOO -$ 1,589.41 $3,999.98 -25.03 
t250 -$2,655 .77 $3,765.43 -44.43 
t500 -$2,381 .76 $3,752.87 -39.98 
t750 -$1 ,938.2 1 $3,513 . 12 -34.76 
tl OOO -$2,000.9 1 $3, 751.82 -33 .60 
The best performing GTM was the fixed stop level of 1000 that had a mean 2 year loss 
for the 6 year period of $1 ,589.41 and a standard deviation of profit of $3,999.98 which 
happened to be the median standard deviation of the 9 observed for ORSl. The worst 
performing GTM was the trailing $250 stop loss strategy which showed a mean 2 year loss of 
$2,655.77 for the six year period and a standard deviation of $3,765.43 . 
The ORSJ trading strategy tested that best fit the entire 1987- 1992 period for the two 
contracts was a 7 day RSI using a 15 buy level , 100 sell level and a $ I 000.00 trailing stop 
loss. It generated $22, 700.00 in profits (aJ I profits and drawdowns include a $90.00 
transaction fee) . It had its largest drawdown in the 1989-1990 period of -$1200.00 and 
generated 2 1 winning trades out of a total of 3 I. The worse performance of the ORSI 
strategies tested came from a 4 day RSI with a 15 buy level, 75 sell level and a $250.00 
trailing stop. It lost -$43,420 generating 79 winning trades out of a total of 251 . Its largest 
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drawdown occurred in 1987 to 1988 , -$ 16,970. Neither the best or worst performing trading 
rules were selected by the historical optimization procedures. They are presented as a way of 
representing the range of performance over the entire 1987 to l 992 period and to quantify the 
extreme degrees of ri sk and reward fo r the period. 
The overa ll average of profit and standard deviation of profit by sto p loss strategy was 
calculated from Table 4.4 to compare performance of general stop los strategies. The no stop 
level from row one in the table had a mean profit of -$ 1, 746.68 with an average standard 
deviation of $4, I 09.27. The fixed stop levels had an average mean profit of -$1850.80 with a 
average standard deviation of $4, 133. The trailing stop levels had an average mean profit of 
-$2244. 16 with an average standard deviation o f $3,695.8 I . The z scores for each of the stop 
strategies indicate that the null hypothesis of zero profits for each strategy cannot be rejected. 
Conclusions 
ORSI on the whole does not appear to fit the 1987-1992 live hog futures data very 
well The no stop loss results in Table 4 4 probably most closely reflect the fit of the basic 
ORSI strategy to the data, since trading signals come only !Tom the OR J method and the 
expiration of the contract. The results also reflect the entire 6 years of data . The no stop 
method lost money and had a large variance. Negative mean profits and large standard 
deviations of profit were found for every stop strategy in Table 4.4. Results from thi s research 
suggest that the random selection of a day length and buy and ell level for ORSI would not 
be expected to perform well for any of the stop strategies tested, including no stop loss. The 
no stop loss strat egy had the largest mean profit of any o f the stop stra tegies, -$1 , 746.68. 
although it had a negative mean profit for the 6 year period. This suggests that the basic ORSI 
strategy was not improved by the addition of a stop loss rule. The stop level did affect results. 
The average of the 4 fixed stop loss summary I 987-1992 profits (from Table 4.4) was 
-$1850.80 whil e the average fo r the 4 trailing stops was -$2,244. 16. 
Jn contrast to the negative conclusion regarding ORSI generally, specific ORSI trading 
rules had surprisingly positive ex post profits when selected historically on the basis of profit 
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and the index. Both profit and index historically optimized individual trading rules were much 
less profitable out of sample in the '89-'90 and '9 1-'92 periods than they were in '87-'88. This is 
not surprising since each was the best performer out of 1323 possibilities in the '87-'88 period 
with regard to profit and with regard to the index which was based on both period sum of 
profits and sum oflosses. The consistency of out of sample positive profits fo r both groups 
was surprising. To some extent, this was due to the same trading rule being selected by both 
criteria or because the same day length and buy-sell level was optimum with different stop 
strategies within a selection criteria. 
The out of sample profits fo r the rules selected on the basis of profit fo r the '89-'92 
period totaled $24,480 on 158 trades for an average trade profit of $ 154.94 . The no stop rule 
averaged $ 1030 profit per 2 year period, the fixed stop rules averaged $2, 740 and the trailing 
stop rules $62.50. For the index optimized rules the to tal '89-'92 profit was $22,720 obtained 
from 226 trades fo r an average profit of $100.53 per trade. The average 2 year profit fo r the 
no stop loss rule was $ 1030 (the same rule as profit optimization was selected), while the 
fixed stop average was $19 15 and the trailing stop $667.50. These results, coupled with 
consistently positive correlations between period profi ts for all specific parameter 
combinations, leads to a conclusion that hi storical optimization based on both profit and the 
index was effective, based on the 4 year out of sample period results. Profit optimization 
obtained slightly better out of sample results than those of the index selected rules . 
Out of sample results suggest that a fi xed stop loss rule is preferable to a traili ng stop 
loss or no stop loss at all. Thi s is a different conclusion than that reached by looking at the 
stop loss strategy over all possible rule combinations over 6 years (Table 4 .4), although the 
fixed rule performed better than the trailing stop loss in that case. 
The results of thi s study of ORSI suggest that the conclusion regarding the 
effectiveness of ORSI used on live hog futures is linked to the conclusion of whether ORSI 
histo rical optimizat ion is effective. This study supported the conclusion that historical 
optimization is effecti ve. 
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CHAPTERS 
TRENDING RELATIVE STRENGTH INDEX 
Procedure 
The TRSl research procedure was very similar to the one used fo r ORSI explained in 
the previous chapter. TRSI uses the same RSI statistic as ORSI but operates from a different 
philosophy with regard to future price direction . TRSI assumes that price trends continue. 
Since high RSI values are formed by higher trending prices and low RSI values by lower 
trending values, TRSI buys when RSI is relatively high and sells when RSI is relatively low. 
This is the opposite of the ORSI strategy. TRSl was evaluated over the same number of RST 
day lengths as ORSI (4 to 30). Like ORSI, the buy and sell critical levels for the RSI were 0 
to 30 and 70 to I 00 in steps of 5, but this time the high values were buy signals and the low 
values were sell signals. 
All four of the technical analysis methods used in this study, including TRSI, utilize the 
same 9 stop loss strategies and methods of calculating the historical index, summary 
correlation statistics and 1987-1992 mean and standard deviation of profit. The same general 
historical optimization and testing strategy is used in all 4 methods as well. The main 
difference in procedure between ORSI, TRSI, OMA and DMI involves the parameters used in 
each and their method of calculation and use. The parameters used for TRSI and their method 
of calculation are the same as for ORSI. The use of RSI with the TRSI method involves the 
reversal of roles for the buy and sell levels of RSI as used in ORSJ. There were 1323 
individual rules tested for each TRSl GTM or stop loss strategy and 11 ,907 individual rules 
tested overall. 
Results 
The same tabular format is utilized for all 4 technical analysis methods in reporting 
results. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report TRSl out of sample results for individual trading rules 
selected as optimum for each stop loss strategy in the '87-'88 period. Note the reversal of 
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order for the buy and sell levels. The ru le identification consists of day length, sell level then 
buy level. (Tables 4.1 and 4.2 listed buy level then sell level). There were identical day length 
buy-sell combinations selected as optimum for different stop loss strategies for TRSl. The 
same niles were selected as optimum by both the profit and the index criteria for the fixed 
stop loss strategies, and only 2 rules were different for the trailing stops. There were only 11 
different individual trading rules selected from a possible 18 different stop loss I optimization 
combinations. Overall, the out of sample profits were remarkably consistent, although based 
on only 11 observations. Only 2 optimized methods lost money in 4 years. The 8-0-80 no stop 
loss strategy made $8,460 on 11 trades in 4 years and was the best performer out of sample. 
The worst performing out of sample rule, the 12-20-70 $250 trailing stop method, had buy 
and sell levels that were not near the extremes for RSI values, and had a close trailing stop 
loss level. It had the largest number of out of sample trades for TRSI, a total of 54 in 4 years. 
1t appears from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 that the more profitable trading rules tend to be ones that 
trade less frequently than others. The most profitable 8-0-80 no stop loss combination had the 
least number of out of san1ple trades ( 11 ) . 
Winning trade percentages across all selected optimized rules tended to be less than 
50%. This, combined with a profitable performance on average meant that the size of the 
winning trades were larger than the losing trades. Day lengths selected ranged from 8 to 2 1. 
There were a number of niles selected as optimum with a buy level of 70 suggesting that the 
range of 70 to 100 for the buy level could have been wider. 
Total 4 year profit for the TRSI profit optimized trades was $27,000 generated from 
20 I trades for an average profit of $134.32 per trade. The total 4 year profit for the index 
selected group was $29,780 earned on 186 trades for an average profit of $160.11. 
For the profit optimized group, the average 2 year total profit for the no stop loss rule 
was $4230. For the fixed stop niles average 2 year total profit was $ 1725 compared to $940 
for the trailing stops. 
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Table 5.1 Out of sample results of TRSl trading rules historically optimized on 
'87-'88 profit 
stop day I. 89-90 91-92 89-90 9 1-92 89-90 9 1-91 
loss sell I. profit profit max. max ratio + ratio + 
rule buy I. d.d. d.d. trades trades 
none 8-0-80 $4040 $4420 -$3040 -$470 0.33 0.60 
f250 8-0- 0 $4780 -$3 160 -$1330 -$31 60 0 30 0.14 
fSOO 2 1-1 0-70 $ 1490 $620 -$3850 -$680 0.25 0.43 
f750 21-1 0-70 $2070 $1370 -$3240 -$ 11 20 0.43 0.50 
flOOO 7-0-75 $4700 $1930 -$2 150 -$ 1610 0.50 0.38 
t250 12-20-70 -$73 0 -$4550 -$1790 -$4590 0.38 0.28 
t500 12-5-70 $270 -$760 -$2820 -$1220 0.33 0.43 
t750 12-5-7(1 $5990 -$22 10 -$2550 -$2320 0.56 0.31 
t1 000 12-5-70 $6150 $580 -$2880 -$2020 0.50 0.44 
89-92 
total 
trades 
11 
24 
15 
13 
16 
54 
29 
22 
17 
Correlation values for TRSI are found in table 5.3. Only one period to period 
correlation of profit had a negative value fo r TRSI. The values were consistently positive, 
although not as positive in magnitude as ORSI. The overall average correlation was .35. The 
overall average correlation for the fixed stop strategies was .37, and .31 for the trailing stops. 
Both the fixed and trai ling stop correlation of profits were less than .49 for the no stop 
strategy. The posit ive correlations of profits between periods for all rules support the results 
of historical optimization ofTRSI, which found positive profits in the '87-'88 period 
continuing through the subsequent periods. 
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Table 5.2 Out of sample results ofTRSI trading rules historically optimized on 
'87-'88 index value 
stop day 1. 89-90 9 1-92 89-90 91 -92 89-90 91-91 
loss sell I. profit profit max. max ratio + ratio + 
rule buy I. d.d. d .d. trades trades 
none 8-0-80 $4040 $4420 -$3040 -$470 0.33 0.60 
f250 8-0-80 $4780 -$3] 60 -$ 1330 -$3160 0.30 0. 14 
f500 21-10-70 $ 1490 $620 -$3850 -$680 0.25 0.43 
f750 21-10-70 $2070 $ 1370 -$3240 -$1 120 0.43 0.50 
f1000 7-0-75 $4700 $ 1930 -$2 150 -$1610 0.50 0.38 
t250 7-0-75 -$50 -$3210 -$930 -$3880 0.48 0.33 
t500 12-5-70 $270 -$760 -$2820 -$1220 0.33 0.43 
t750 12-5-70 $5990 -$2210 -$2550 -$2320 0.56 0.31 
tlOOO 11 -5-70 $4040 $3450 -$2920 -$3 10 0.33 0.60 
89-92 
total 
trades 
11 
24 
15 
13 
16 
45 
29 
22 
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1987 to 1992 period mean 2 year profits were generally positive for TRSI with only 2 
out of 9 stop loss strategies showing negative profits. This is not surprising after looking at 
ORSl and reali zing TRSI was tested o n the same data set and basically takes positions in the 
opposite direction. (The previous chapter noted negative mean profits fo r ORSI). The 
standard deviations of profit are quite large for TRSl. There was considerable variance in 
profit levels between day length buy-sell levels as well as between 2 year periods for individual 
trading methods, and both of these sources of variation are reflected in the high standard 
deviations of 1987-1 992 profit for each GTM. The alternative hypothesis of positive mean 
profits is accepted for all of the stop levels except the trailing $250 and $500 stops at the 5% 
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significance level For those tops the null hypothesis (that their mean profits are zero) is not 
rejected at the 5% significance level. 
The best performjng TR I GTM was the fixed $250 stop loss strategy with a 2 year 
average profit of $815 .23 . The worst performing GTM was the trajling $500 stop loss with a 
-$685.60 2 year average profit. 
Table 5.3 TRST period correlation statistics 
stop 87-88 87-88 89-90 average 
loss 89-90 9 1-92 9 1-92 
none 0 .55 0. 55 0.36 0.49 
f250 0.46 0.23 0 .65 0 .45 
fSOO 0.45 0.34 0. 13 0.3 1 
f750 0 .52 0.46 0 .30 0.43 
fIOOO 0.53 0 .57 0 .3 1 0.47 
t250 0.23 -0.15 0.20 0. 10 
t500 0.22 0.22 0 .39 0.28 
t750 0.68 0.10 0.28 0 .35 
tl OOO 0.62 0 .48 0 .37 0 .49 
The TRSl individual tradi ng rule with the be t profit for the 1987- 1992 period overall 
was an 11 day RSI with a buy level of 70 and a sell level of 0 with no stop loss. It had a total 
profit of $20,430 on 12 trades and had a maximum 2 year period drawdown of -$2,380. The 
worst performing individual trading rule was a 14 day RSI with a buy level of 95 and a sell 
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level of 30. it lost -$24,060 on 13 trades and had a maximum 2 year period drawdown of -
$ 13, 120. 
The average 2 year profit and standard deviation of profit by stop loss category, 
calculated from Table 5.4 were: $595.89 and $4,075 .97 for the no stop loss, $627.84 and 
$3, 190.31 for the fi xed stop and -$113 .29 and $2,484.98 for the trailing stop. 
Table 5.4 TRSf 1987- 1992 2 year mean profit, standard 
deviation of profit and z scores. 
stop los mean profit standard z cores 
strategy deviation 
none $595.89 $4,075 .97 9.2 1 
f250 $815.23 $2,968.64 17.30 
fSOO $608.83 $3,067.98 12 50 
f750 $509.32 $3,299.30 9.73 
f!OOO $577.97 $3,425.32 10.63 
t250 -$612.39 $1 ,90 1.24 -20.29 
t500 -$685 .60 $2,04 l.25 -2 1 16 
t750 $230.28 $2,9 17.89 4.97 
tl OOO $614.57 $3,079.54 12.57 
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Conclusions 
Using the no stop method results for the entire 6 year period from Table 5.4 as a proxy 
for the fit of the general TRSJ method to the data, TRSI appeared to fit the data somewhat 
better than ORSI, although the standard deviation is quite large. In this case, a stop loss 
strategy appears to improve the general TRSI method. The fixed stop loss outperformed the 
trailing stop loss and no stop loss strategy in Table 5 .4. The out of sample results in Tables 
5.1 and 5.2 favored the no stop loss strategy, but the fixed stop was superior to the trailing 
stop there also. 
The out of sample profits of the historically optimized TRSI methods were overall 
quite positive. The generally positive mean 1987-1 992 profits tend to detract from the 
strength of conclusions regarding the effectiveness of historical optimization applied to TRSI. 
Positive mean profits fo r most GTMs over the entire 6 year period imply that positive out of 
sample profits are more likely to be observed due to random chance, while large standard 
deviations argue that any observation is more likely due to chance, and takes away from any 
out of sample conclusion. Based on out of sample performance, the conclusion is drawn that 
historical optimization of trading parameters for TRS f based on profit and the index are both 
effective. The only difference between the rules selected by either criteria involved the $250 
trailing stop and the $ 1000 trailing stop. The index appeared to be the better optimization 
criteria in this case since the average 2 year out of sample period profits for trailing stops was 
$940 versus $592.50 for those selected by profit. The confidence in that conclusion is 
mitigated by the fact that the difference between the optimization criteria i solely accounted 
for by the performance of 2 rules for each criteria. 
TRSI was generally profitable out of sample in spite of genera lly having more losing 
trades than winning trades. Generally lower numbers of trades were associated with higher 
profits. 
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CHAPTER6 
DUAL MOVING AVERAGE 
Procedure 
A dual moving average is based on the assumption that prices trend. These trends are 
detected by calculating a short moving average (NJ of daily closing prices and a longer length 
moving average (N1) of closing prices. The shorter length average is more responsive to 
changes in price than the longer average containing more price observations. When prices do 
begin to trend in a different direction than the immediate past, the shorter moving average will 
"cross" the longer average in the direction of the emerging trend, either up or down. (When 
the averages are charted graphically the lines connecting each day's short and long moving 
averages will literally cross as in Figure 6.1 ). This is taken as a signal that a trend has begun. 
The trend is then assumed to continue until the shorter moving average crosses the longer 
average in the opposite direction. 
Short moving average day lengths (N5) were calculated for day lengths of from 1 to 19 
in intervals of 2. Long moving average day lengths (N1) were calculated for day lengths from 
21 to 51 in intervals of 2. (5 1 days was selected as an upper limit for the long average because 
some market commentators have suggested that 40 and 50 day averages are used by some 
large commodity funds as a technical trading indicator) .Thi s resulted in 160 different short and 
long day length combinations tested. They move in the sense that an N day moving average 
contains today's closing price and the previous N-1 days' closing prices. A three day moving 
average would be calculated as fo llows: (today's close t yesterday's close + the day before 
yeslerday's close) 3. The average "moves" in that tomorrow's 3 day moving average won't 
include today's oldest closing price, but will include tomorrow's close. 
The basic moving average concept has been modified in two ways for this study in an 
attempt to model how the simple moving average method may be used in actual practice. The 
fi rst modification involved the use of the same 9 fixed and trailing stops utilized on all 
forecasting methods. The calculation of the stop levels was the same as the other methods, 
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and followed the ame convention that once an open trade had been closed out due to a top 
loss signal, a new trading signal from the indicator was required to generate a new trade. ( In 
the case of the dual moving average, a new trading signal consisted of a crossing of the long 
average by the short average) . The second modification involved the use of trading bands 
around the long moving average. Five band widths of 0, .25 , .50, .75 and 1.00 dollars per cwt. 
were used. These band widths acted like a neutral zone around the long moving average. The 
short moving average was not considered to have crossed the long average unless it exceeded 
the band width on the other side of the long average. When the band width wa 0, all that was 
required was a short moving average price greater than or less than the long moving average 
price. When the band width was greater than zero, all short average penetrations of the long 
average not exceeding the band were ignored. Using a $ 1.00 band for example, if the short 
average had previously been below the long average, a close of greater than $1 .00 in exces of 
the long average price would be required to give a buy signal. Assuming that occurred, the 
long position would be maintained until a sell signal occurred, a stop loss was exceeded or the 
contract expired. A sell signal would require the short average to be $ 1.00 or more below the 
long average. The band widths were always symmetrical in their application. l f a band width 
was used, it applied to the band width above and below the long average. All combinations of 
day lengths were tried using each of the 5 band widths for each of the OMA - stop loss 
combinations or GTMs. This resulted in a total of 800 ind ividual trading rules for each GTM 
( 1Oxl6x5), or 7200 individual trading rules for the OMA method. 
Like all the technical methods investigated, calculations of technical parameter (in this 
case long and short moving averages and the band width modification) were assumed to take 
place after the close of trading for the day and included the current day's price. Signals were 
alway calculated on closing prices and executed at the following day's opening price. 
Results 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 follow the same tabular format as the previous chapter . The 
technical parameters that distinguish an individual tradi ng rule are the short average day 
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length, long average day length and the band width denoted in the second column of the table. 
The best performing out of sample rule for OMA was a 13 day short average, 31 day long 
average, 1.00 band width using a fixed $1000 stop loss. It gained $4810 in the '89-'92 period 
and had a maximum drawdown of $ 11 70 in '89-'90. The worst performing out of sampl.e rule 
was the 3 day short average, 25 day long average with 0 band width and a trailing $250 stop. 
It lost $6700 in the 4 year out of sample period with a maximum drawdown in '91 -'92 of 
$5600. T he opti mized performance out of sample was rather poor overall. Thi1teen different 
distinct indi vidual rules were chosen out of a possible 18 between the two opti mization 
criteria . Of the 13, only 5 were profitable over the 4 year out of sample period taken as a 
whole. 
The profit optimized rules lost $ 11 ,670 in to tal in the 4 year out of sampl.e period on 
263 trades for an average loss per trade of $44.37. The index optimized trades did even worse 
losing $16,370 on 327 trades for an average loss per trade of $50.06. The profit optimized 
rules did better as a w hole than the index selected rules. 
The day lengths selected as optimum were widely dispersed throughout the range 
studied as were the band widths. The best performing out of sample method happened to fall 
towards the middle of the range of day lengths with a 13 day short length and a 31 day lo ng 
length. 
Period correlation values were very close to zero for OMA generally. The overall 
average correlation value was . I 0. Either correlation value were close to zero for a particular 
OMA stop loss ru le or there was little consistency in correlation values between periods. 
There were quite a few negative correlation statistic values overall and often they were 
interspersed with positi ve correlations in other periods. The average of the fixed stop loss 
correlatio ns in column 5 of table 6.3 was .09 while those of the trailing correlatio ns was . 12. 
Since the no stop loss rule had an average correlation of .10 there was virtual ly no difference 
in correlation values between the 3 different stop loss strategies. 
48 
3 47 u 
~ 
<l> 
a.4s 
f:A-
45 
45 
I 
···-------------·-·----------------l1r ··--------------------·-····--------·t· 
] 11 1
1 
' 1 ·······~·· ···. t. '. l] \ '" . j J ... l fjjll ~. 11 '1 ············ f :; ~ / 
. . . . .... 1 . . .. .. LJjfJlllf -~ ... . . .. 
12-23-86 to 3-20-87 
11 day m.a 
21 day m.a 
Figure 6. 1 1 I day and 21 day moving averages calculated for the June '87 live hog futures 
contract. 
Only 2of9 GTMs had negative mean profits for the 1987- 1992 period. There was a 
great deal of variatio n in profi ts as the standard deviation values in Table 6.4 indicate. The 
stop loss strategy that best fit the entire 6 years of data was the fixed $ 1000 stop loss, with a 2 
year mean pro fit of $ 1,004.85 . The worst fitting sto p loss strategy was the trailing $500 stop 
loss w hich had a mean 2 year loss of $2,087.29. The average 2 year profi t for the fi xed stop 
methods in table 6 .4 was $886 65 with an average standard deviation fo r the fixed group of 
$3,046.45 . The average mean profit fo r the trai ling sto p methods in the table was -$449.55 
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with a standard deviation of $2,43 l 54 Based on the calculated z scores in Table 6.4, the 
alternative hypothesis that mean profits are greater than zero at the 5% significance level is 
accepted fo r all but the trailing $250 and $500 stops, where the null hypothe is that their mean 
profits are zero cannot be rejected . 
Table 6. I Out of sample results of OMA trading rules hi to rically optimized on 
'87-'88 profit 
stop s. days 89-90 9 1-92 89-90 9 1-92 89-90 91-9 1 
loss I day profit profit max. max ratio + ratio + 
rule band d.d. d.d . trades trades 
none 13-31- 100 $2960 $ 1370 -$1170 -$230 0.43 0.50 
f25 0 3-5 1- 1 00 $2430 $250 -$1440 -$460 0.43 0.50 
fSOO 7-4 7- 1 00 -$I 630 -$790 -$3760 -$ 1500 0.22 0.50 
f750 7-47- 1 00 -$2070 -$ 1300 -$3520 -$20 10 0.33 0.50 
fl OOO 13-3 1- 1.00 $3440 $ 1370 -$11 70 -$230 0.43 0.50 
t250 7-27-0 00 $640 -$5 120 -$1 390 -$5290 0.43 0.21 
t500 19-39-1 00 -$3050 -$9 10 -$3050 -$910 0.00 0.00 
t750 3-25-0 uo -$20 -$6550 -$3440 -$6740 0.34 0.26 
tl OOO 3-25-0.00 $4 120 -$6810 -$3440 -$7000 0.4 1 0.26 
89-92 
total 
trades 
9 
13 
15 
15 
9 
52 
8 
71 
71 
47 
The DM A individual trading rule that best fit the 1987- 1992 data overa ll was a 11 day 
short moving average, 27 day long moving average with a $1 .00 band and no stop loss. lt 
showed a S 17,270 profit over the entire 6 year period on 16 trades and had a worse case 2 
year drawdown of -$1610 in '89-'90. The poorest performing individual trading rule for the 
entire 1987-1 992 period was a I day short moving average, 33 day long moving average with 
no band and a $500 trailing stop. lt lost -$23 , 780 on.152 trade and had a worse case 2 year 
drawdown of -$10,970 in '89-'90. 
Table 6.2 Out of sample result of DMA trading rules historically optimized on 
'87-'88 index value 
sto p s. days 89-90 9 1-92 89-90 9 1-92 89-90 91-9 1 
loss I. day profit profi t max. max ratio + ratio + 
rule band d.d. d.d trades trades 
none 19-31-0.75 -$ 11 90 $ 1570 -$ 16 10 -$ 160 0.29 0.50 
f250 5-51-0 25 $5620 -$ 1390 -$ 1550 -$2990 0.36 0.22 
fSOO 7-47-1 00 -$1630 -$790 -$3760 -$1500 0.22 0.50 
f750 7-4 7- 1.00 -$2070 -$ 1300 -$3520 -$20 10 0.33 0.50 
nooo 13-3 1-1 00 $3440 $ 1370 -$ 11 70 -$230 0.43 0.50 
t250 3-25-0.00 -$ 1130 -$5600 -$2960 -$5790 0.44 0.26 
t500 3-47-0.0U -$4530 $520 -$5800 -$8 10 0.26 0.45 
t750 3-25-0.00 -$20 -$6550 -$3440 -$6740 0.34 0.26 
t! OOO 3-25-0 00 $4120 -$6810 -$3440 -$7000 0.4 1 0.26 
89-92 
total 
trades 
9 
23 
15 
15 
9 
71 
43 
71 
71 
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Table 6.3 OM A period correlation statistics 
stop 87-88 87-88 89-90 average 
loss 89-90 9 1-92 9 1-92 
none 0 .04 0.36 -0. 10 0.10 
f250 0.40 -0.06 -0.28 0.02 
fSOO 0.04 0.24 -0.06 0.08 
t750 0.07 0.38 0.00 O. l 5 
fl OOO -0.03 0.34 -0.02 0.10 
t250 0.55 -0 .10 -0.03 0. 14 
t500 0.40 0. 12 -0.20 0. 10 
t750 0.06 0.14 0.16 0. 12 
t l OOO 0 .02 0 .28 0 .05 0. 12 
Conclusions 
Using the no stop loss 2 year mean profit and standard deviation (from Table 6.4) as 
an indicator of the fit of the general OMA strategy lo the data, OMA tits the data better than 
ORSI or T R I The mean 2 year profi t is higher than the other methods and the tandard 
deviation, while still quite high at $3 ,235.50, is the lo\: e t of the three. Lt is urprising that the 
out of sample testing of individual rules optimized on profit and t he index fared so poorly for 
this method, although the no stop loss optimized rul es were profitable for both. It reflects 
poorly on the performance of OM A historical optimizati on both using profit and the 
calculated index, that out of sample profits of optimi zed methods were not better given the 
mostly positive mean profits for the entire period fo r most of the stop loss strategies. Neither 
profit o r index optimization was effecti ve across a ll stop strategies, but everal individual stop 
loss strategies were profit able out of sample. The poor correlations of profit statistics are 
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consistent with the relatively poor out of sample performance of the optimized methods. 
An intere ting observation on the out of sample performance of OMA centers on the 
rule selected by profit for the trailing $500 stop. While it was not the largest totaJ dollar loser, 
lo ing $3,960 over 4 years, it lost money on all 8 of its trades This run contrary to generaJ 
observations that the more profitable trading rules tend to be the ones trading fewer contracts. 
This rule had the fewest trades of all of the OMA optimized methods. For the other optimized 
OMA rules, the conclusion that fewer trades generally lead to higher profits seemed to hold . 
Table 6.4 DMA 1987-l 992 2 year mean profit, standard 
deviation of profit and z scores. 
stop loss sample sample z scores 
strategy mean profit std dev 
none $97 1.1 5 $3,235.50 14.70 
f250 $882.17 $3,026. 10 14.28 
f500 $907.36 $2,92 1.94 15 .2 1 
f750 $752 23 $3, 133 .58 11.76 
nooo $ 1,004.85 $3 , 104.19 15.86 
t250 -$916.52 $ 1,729.89 -25 96 
t500 -$2,087.29 $2,047.48 -49.94 
t750 $364. 14 $3,024.23 5.90 
tl OOO $841.47 $2,924.54 14. 10 
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According to Table 6.4, the addition of stop loss rules did not seem to make DMA any 
more profitable over the 1987- 1992 period. The average 2 year profit for the 4 fixed stop loss 
rules was not better than the no stop strategy but was better than the trailing stop methods. 
Out of sample results in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 suggest different conclusions regarding 
stop loss strategy. The optimization by profit results (Table 6.1) agrees with Table 6.4 that the 
no stop strategy is best. Optimization by index results (Table 6.2) suggest that the fixed stop 
strategy on average is superior. The no stop loss strategy appears to be the best stop level 
choice overall. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DIRECTIONAL MOVEMENT INDEX 
Procedure 
DMl operates on the assumption that prices trend. It is a trend following system like 
TRSI and DMA but the parameters used and their method of calculation and interpretation 
are different. J. Welles Wilder Jr. developed the Directional Movement Index system and 
presented it in New Concepts in TechnicaJ Trading Systems (l 978). The procedure used for 
DMI in this study followed a modified procedure used by Drinka and Kille ( 1985 pp. 40-41 ), 
but modified their procedure. DMJ is by fa r the most complicated technical trading system 
looked at in this study. It requires a significant amount of lead time that exceeds its day length 
parameter due to its method of calculation. The calcul ation procedure results in 3 significant 
variables that together determine trading signals. The first, ADX, is considered a measure of 
the strength of the trend in prices either up or down. The stronger the past trend, the higher 
the resulting ADX calculation . Trades are initiated only when the ADX variable exceeds a 
minimum threshold level. The other two variables, which thi s study will name Dplus and 
Dminus are the variables that determine the direction of the trade and its timing, given that the 
ADX is above its threshold level. If the Dplus variable exceeds the Dminus variable a long 
position is establi shed. If the Dminus exceeds the Dplus variable in value a short trade is 
established. No band widths similar to those used in the OMA study were used fo r Dplus or 
Dminus. Following the same convention used throughout this research, if no current position 
was held only one contract was traded on the foll owing open when a crossing trading signal 
was generated. If an open position was held, two contracts were traded on the following 
open, one to close the existing position and one to establish a new position in the opposite 
direction. 
The ADX in this study served not only as a validation requirement for issuing a trading 
signal based on Dplus crossing Dminus or vice versa, it also was used to generate an 
additional trading signal to close out a trade. This closing out of a trade o n a basis other than 
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accrued loss, was unique in this study to DMJ. It also was a departure from the Drinka and 
Kille tudy ( 1985). The additional signal was implemented by closing out a trade on the 
following open anytime that the ADX parameter fell below the level required to generate a 
new trade A new trading signal would then be required to get back into the market. The 
implementation of this additional signal meant that the DMI system was only in the market as 
long as the previous day's ADX level was above a minimum level. 
DMI is calculated for a specific N day length. This study used day lengths from 4 to 
38 in step of 2. ln order to explain the calculation of ADX, Dplus and Dminus it is necessary 
to first understand the calculation of several preliminary variables. HighDiff will be defined as 
the difference between the high price of the day and the previous day's high price. Low Di ff is 
defined to be the difference between the day's low price and the previous day's low price. 
Trange is defined as the largest absolute value of the following three differences between: ( 1) 
the hjgh and low price of the current day (2) the high price of the current day and the 
previous day's closing price (3) the low price of the current day and the previous day's closing 
price. TrSum is the sum of the previous N-1 day's Trange values plus today's Trange. 
HighSum and LowSum are calculated from the previous N-1 days and today's 
HjghDiff and LowDiff values For each of the previous days (including today), either 
HighDiff, LowDiff or neither, is determined to be relevant and is added to its respective sum 
variable, but never both on the same day. If the day's high is higher than the previou day's 
high and its low is higher than the previous day' low then HjghDiff is added to Hjgh um and 
LowSum is ignored. If the day's low is lower than the previous day's low and the high is lower 
than the previous days high then LowDiff is added to LowSum and HighSum is ignored. If the 
day's high is higher and the low is lower than the previous day's values, the price difference 
that is greatest is added to its sum variable and the other sum variable is ignored. ln the event 
that neither the current high nor the current low is higher or lower respectively than its 
previous day's counterpart, the day is ignored and no summation is done. 
Dplus is calculated by takjng the HighSurn variable calculated for a particular day and 
dividing it by TrSum for that day. Dminus i likewise computed by taking the ab olute value 
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of the LowSum value for the day and dividing it by the same TrSum value for the day. The 
Dplus variable can be thought of as a rough measure of the amount of up movement in price 
relative to total movement in price over a previous N day period, whi le Dminus can be 
thought of as reflecting the ratio of down price movement to total movement over the 
previous N days. 
ADX was calculated in the following way. A variable defined as DX was computed by 
the following formula: abs/ (Dplus -Dminus) I (Dplus + Dmi1111s) j = DX There were no 
Dplus or Dminus variables available until there had been N+ I days worth of observations for 
each contract . The DX variable was calculated for the N+ l day onward fo r each individual 
contract. Another variable defined as DX Sum was calculated as the sum of the previous N 
day's DX variables (including today's) . The first day that a DXSum could be calculated was on 
the 2N + 1 day of observations. On this day the first ADX could be ca lculated by dividing 
DXSum by N and multiplying by 100. It can be seen by the method of calculating DX that 
when the values of Dplus and Dminus are about equal that DX is close to 0. When either 
Dplus or Dminus is near zero and the other is close to one then DX is close to one in value. 
Since DX is summed over N days and divided by N and multiplied by I 00 to calcu late ADX, 
ADX ranges in value from 0 to I 00. The sharper the trend in prices either up or down, the 
higher the resulting ADX value. By requiring a minimum ADX value, the DMI system 
implicitly assumes that the strength of the past trend is an indication of its probability of 
continuation into the future. 
16 ADX values were evaluated in this study, ranging from 5 to 80 in value in steps of 
5. The same 9 stop loss rules were used for DMl as for the other three technical methods. 
Thjs use of stop losses was also a departure from the Drinka and Kille ( 1985) study. There 
were 288 different individua l trading rules ( J 8 day lengths x 16 ADX levels) evaluated on 
each one of these stop loss ru les for a total of 2592 different individual trading rules evaluated 
for DMI overall. Figure 7. 1 is calculated on the same price series as Figures 4. 1 and 6.1 and 
demonstrates how ADX, Dplus and Dminus respond to price changes. 
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Figure 7.1 14 day DMI calculated for the June '87 live hog futures contract. 
Results 
There was litt le variation between methods selected fo r out of sample testing. For 
DMI, all of the rules selected as optimum by the historical profit criteria were also selected by 
the calculated index criteria. There were only 4 different day length I ADX combination 
selected with the rest of the difference in rules coming from the differences in stop loss 
strategies. OveraU, that meant that there were only 9 out of a possible 18 different 
individualized trading rules selected to be evaluated out of sample for this method, and total 
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out of sample results for profit optimization exactly equaled those for index optimization. 
The format for Table 7.1 is similar to the format used in previous chapters for out of 
sample results but represents both profit and index optimized rules since they were identical. 
The characteristics that di stinguish an individual trading rule for DMl are the day length used 
in the computations and the mjnjmum ADX value required. These characteristics of the rules 
selected as optimum are li sted in column 2 of the tables . The best performing out of sample 
rule was the 34 day DMl using a 5 ADX critical level and a trailing $750 stop loss. It was the 
only individual trading rule having a positive profit over the 4 year out of sample period. It 
generated a total 4 year profit of $290 on 44 trades for the period. The worst performing 
optimized rule was the 8 day DMI using an ADX of20. It lost a whopping $ 18,380 in the 4 
year out of sample period. Overall, the out of sample results for DMI methods were very 
poor, even worse than DMA. 
The optimized trading rules lost a total of $73 ,370 in 4 years of out of sample testing 
on 558 trades fo r an average -$ 13 1.49 per trade. The only profitable rule out of sample had 
the lowest number of trades at 44 and the worst performing rule had the largest number of 
trades at I 11 . 
The correlation stat istics in table 7.2 fo r DMI are near zero on average and are 
frequently negative and change signs. The average of all of the correlations in column 5 is .13 
while the average for the fixed stop strategies is .09 and the trailing strategies .18. The 
instability of the correlations between periods can be illustrated by noting that all of the period 
I to period 2 correlations (column 2) are near zero. The correlations between period l and 3 
(column 3) are strongly negative and period 2 to period 3 correlations (column 4) are trongly 
positive. 
The best stop loss strategy for DMl for the entire 6 year study period was the fixed 
$250 stop loss. It had a mean 2 year profit of -$ 1,205 .16 and a standard deviation of 
$3 ,282.94. The worst stop strategy had a mean profit of-$1 ,484.65 and standard deviation of 
$3, l 09.09 and was the trailing $500 stop loss method. The average mean profit and standard 
deviation of profit for the 6 year period for fixed stops was -$1 ,278.59 and $3,361 . 76. 
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Corresponding values for the 4 trailing stops was -$ 1,340.21 and $3, 191 43 respectively. 
Overall perfom1ance of the DMT ystem in this study was extremely poor. Z cores were 
strongly negati ve for all stop loss strategies so that the null hypothesis of zero profit was not 
rejected for any stop loss strategy at the 5% significance level. 
Table 7. 1 Out of ample re ults of DMI trading rules historically optimized on '87-'88 
profit and index 
stop day I. 89-90 9 1-92 89-90 9 1-92 89-90 91-9 1 89-92 
loss adx profit profit max. max ratio + ratio + total 
rule d.d. d.d. trades trades trades 
none 18-20 -$3020 -$7120 -$4200 -$7800 0.25 0.24 61 
f250 16-20 -$2390 -$3740 -$3080 -$4420 0.28 0.33 55 
fSOO 16-20 -$7 10 -$5580 -$2990 -$6260 0.32 0.33 55 
f750 16-20 -$7 10 -$6230 -$2990 -$6910 0.32 0.33 55 
fl OOO 18-20 -$3020 -$7 120 -$4200 -$7800 0.25 0.24 61 
t250 16-20 -$1760 -$3970 -$2520 -$4650 0.32 0 30 55 
t500 8-20 -$5790 -$12590 -$5880 -$ 12590 0.32 0.25 I 11 
t750 34-S $6010 -$5710 -$3040 -$6810 0.47 0.22 44 
t 1000 18-20 -$3020 -$6900 -$4200 -$7580 0 .25 0.24 6 1 
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Table 7.2 DMI period correlation statistics 
stop 87-88 87-88 89-90 average 
loss 89-90 91-92 9 1-92 
none -0.01 -0.33 0.6 1 0 .09 
f250 0.06 -0.29 0.62 0.13 
f500 -0.09 -0.37 0.63 0.06 
f75 0 -0.02 -0.33 0.63 0.09 
flOOO -0.0 l -0.33 0 .6 1 0.09 
t250 0 . 16 -0.07 0.76 0.28 
t500 0 . 12 -0 .05 0.73 0.27 
t750 -0 .08 -0 .36 0.70 0.09 
t 1000 -0.03 -0 .32 0 .6 1 0.09 
The DMJ trading strategy tested that best fit the entire 1987- I 992 period fo r the two 
contracts was a 34 day length DMI using an ADX level of 5 and a $1000.00 trailing stop loss. 
It generated $9, 920 in profits over the six year period. ft had its largest drawdown in the 
1991-1 992 period o f -$6390 and generated 32 winning trades out of a total of 79. The worse 
performance of the DMI strategies tested came from a 6 day DMI with a 20 ADX level and a 
$750.00 trailing stop. lt lost -$30,850 generating 59 winning trades out of a to tal of227. Its 
largest drawdown occurred in 1991to 1992 , -$ 17,270. 
Conclusions 
The DMI method as defined and used in this study did not fit the data well. The 6 year 
summary mean 2 year profits found in table 7.3 are consistent ly negative with wide standard 
deviatio ns. Only ORSI looked worse over the 6 year peri od (Table 4.4). The fixed stop loss 
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strategy average 2 year mean profit and standard devjation looked sl ig htly better than a no 
stop loss strategy over the 6 year period. Profits were so poor in the out of sample study of 
individual rules that DMJ as used in thi s study does not appear worthy of consideration as a 
trading tool. Historical optimization using profit or the index does not appear to be viable. 
Unstable correlation statistics supported the poor observed out of sample profits of the 
optimizat ion methods. 
The results for DMI tend to support the concept that the most profitable trading rule 
tends to generate fewer trades. The DMl method had the largest number of out of sample 
trades of any of the 4 technical methods and turned in the worst perfonnance out of sample. 
Within the DMI method itself, the only out of sample rule to have a positive 4 year profit had 
the lowest number of trades (44) which was still high in comparison to the other studies. The 
worst perfonning DMl out of sample rule had the largest number of trades of any rule for the 
entire study at 1 I I . 
It was unfortunate that DMI did not have more diversity in the rules selected as 
optimum in the out of sample study. This redundancy in rules allowed the few rules picked to 
have a large weight o n the overall results and limited the number of out of sample 
observations of perfonnance. 
It is appropriate to note that the decision to use ADX to both enter as well as exit 
trades was done at the beginning of the study on the rationale that if A.DX measures the 
strenf,rth of a trend and ADX is useful as a gauge of when to enter a trade, it should be useful 
to measure when the trend is waning and it is time to exit. The decision to use the same A.DX 
level as an entry and exit signal was an arbitrary one that limited the number of trading rules 
that were quite large to begin with. In light of the poor performance by the method, it would 
be interesting to explore whether perfonnance would improve if the A.DX exjt level was 
allowed to differ from the A.DX entry level in a future study. It could be allowed to vary 
independently and also to not be used at all as an exit signal. This type of a study wou ld 
increase the number of trading rules looked at by a significant amount. 
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Table 7.3 DM I 1987- 1992 2 year mean profit, standard 
deviation of profit and z scores. 
stop loss sample sample z scores 
strategy mean profit std dev 
none -$ 1,300.97 $3,390.37 - 18.80 
f250 -$ 1,205 . l 6 $3,282.94 -1 7.98 
f500 -$1,277. 79 $3,385. 14 -1 8.49 
f750 -$ 1,316.28 $3,386.68 -1 9.04 
flOOO -$1,315 13 $3,392.28 - 18.99 
t250 -$1,340.05 $2,963.50 -22. 15 
t500 -$1 ,484.65 $3, 109.09 -23.39 
t750 -$ 1 ,267.62 $3,339.45 - 18.60 
tl OOO -$1 ,268.5 1 $3,353 .67 -18.53 
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CHAPTER S 
UM MARY AND CO CLUSJO S 
This study investigated whether 4 methods of technical analysis applied to the li ve hog 
futures market were profitable. An Oscillating Relative Strength Index, Trending Relative 
Strength Index, Dual Moving Average and Directional Movement Index were tested over 
various parameter combinations and stop loss strategies using 1987- 1992 li ve hog futures 
pnces. 
One of the handicaps in trying to determine whether technical analysis works in 
forecasting futures prices is the huge number of possible combinations o f parameters and stop 
loss rules that can be devised to trade futures markets with technical analysis. In the interest of 
keeping the study tractable, this re earch was limited to researching 4 technical analysis 
methods, of which 3 depended on trending prices and o ne depended on oscillating prices. 9 
stop loss strateg ies were implemented fo r those method that both reflected different degree 
of lo s aversion in traders and how the trad ing methods might be used in actual practice. 
Ranges of parameter values for each method were selected in an attempt to reflect common 
usage while limiting the ultimate number of trading rule variations to a workable number. 
Another handicap in concluding whether technical analysis is effecti ve concerns the 
data set used to draw the conclusion. The ultimate test of effectiveness is the actual real world 
ex ante' use of technical analysis in the futures markets. This study used the actual price 
history o f the December and June live hog futures contracts from J 987 to 1992. Only 
December and June were used to keep the study tractable. The data had the advantage of 
being known to be the result of the actual real world price generating proces and was 
tradeable. The data had the disadvantage of being noncontinuous and unable to take 
advantage of large sample statistical properties which could be obtained by an artificial price 
series. Conclusions regarding historical profits were subject to estimation errors regarding 
transaction costs, including slippage. (Transaction costs are veri fiable by actually trading the 
market. but that type of research was beyond the financial means of thi study). 
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Conclusions regarding the profitability of technical analysis used in future markets 
utili zing both actual historical price series and studies utilizing artificially generated price 
serie depend on the premise that the study series represents future actual price series. Thi 1s 
ultimately testable by using an actual future price series ex ante', but the time required for that 
type of study was beyond that available for thi s research. This study's use of all the individual 
trading rule results in the summary 6 year profits and the use of only out of sample results for 
specific optimized trading rules, attempted to deflect criticism that results were obtained from 
"curve fitting" historical data. 
This study relies on the out of sample results of trading rules historically optimized in 
'87-'88 on the basis of profit and a profit-loss index to draw conclusions regarding the 
effectivene s of technical analysis in the live hog futures market ORSI and TRSI were the 
best performing technical analysis methods studied and were profitable across various stop 
lo strategies for the 4 year out of sample period of 1989- 1992. OMA performed better out 
of sample than DMI but both had negative average returns. OMA was profitable out of 
sample for the fi xed and no stop loss strategies but performed poorly with a trailing loss. OMI 
performed poorly for all stop loss combinations. Technical anaJysis was found to be profitable 
in the live hog futures market on the basis of the profitable out of sample performance of 
ORSI and TRSI. 
That optimized OR I and TRSI both hould both be profitable is at first glance a 
paradox, since they depend on the same trend statistic, RSl, but have opposite a umptions 
regarding future trend in price. If the optimized buy and sell levels of RSI tend to identify the 
beginning of trends for the TRSI method and the end of trends for ORSI, there i no reason 
that they could not both be profitable unless their buy levels equaled the other methods' ell 
level and they were both using the same day length for ca lculating the underlyi ng RSI statistic. 
One of the more interesting results of thi study was the finding that the correlation of 
profits across periods seemed to correspond closely with the out of sample results using 
hi torical optimization. In spite of a poor overall profit performance on the 1987-1 992 data, 
OR J had strong positive correlations of period profits and good out of sample profit 
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performance with individual optimized rules. TRSI had positive overall profits on the 1987 -
1992 data, strong positive correlation values, and performed well out of sample. OMA had a 
good overall 6 year profit but low correlation statistics and optimized trading rules did not 
perform well out of sample. DMl had a poor overall profit and low correlation values and 
optimized trading rules perfom1ed poorly out of sample. 
It would be interesting to evaluate in a future study, whether the correlation of profits 
between periods had the same correspondence to subsequent historical optimization results 
when looking at other technical trading methods, or these same methods using different 
futures or securities market data. 
Other suggestions for future research include looking at OMA with no symmetry in 
band width above and below the long moving average required, looking at .DMI without the 
symmetry constraint on the A.DX entry and exit signals, and the incorporation of correlation 
of profits across periods as a way of screening potential candidates for technical analysis 
trading. 
The profitability of the relative strength index tools (ORSI and TRSI) provides 
evidence that the live hog futures market is not weak fom1 efficient. Since one possible source 
of market inefficiency wou Id be the assimilation of market in formation over time, and the 
methods in this study depend on interday market inefficiency, an interesting direction for 
future research would be to look at price dependent trading models that utilize intraday price 
information. In addition to chopping up a days' prices into smaller units and using technjcal 
analysis methods like those utilized in this study, Market Profile would be an interesting tool 
to evaluate in future studies. Market Profile provides intraday prices and actual or estimated 
volume at each price. Market Profile information is provided by both the CBOT and CME and 
is made available through private vendors. J. Peter Steidlmayer ( 1989) developed Market 
Profile and wrote about it in a book, Steidlmayer on Markets. Additional information 
regarding Market Profile is also available from the Market Profile Society International , 
located on the Western Illinois University campus, Macomb, Illinois. 
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